

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050024-2

AD/NE

2 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Completion of Interim Report by (North)
Vietnam Planning Sub-Committee of Sullivan
Task Force

1. You will be receiving today, from Mr. William Sullivan, the sub-committee's interim assessment of (a) what actions the US could take against North Vietnam, and (b) the estimated consequences of such actions.
2. The assessment's principal conclusions are:
 - a. That we doubt that enemy reactions would be extreme.
 - b. That, nevertheless, the US not initiate such actions without being prepared for extreme enemy reactions.
 - c. That world reactions to high-scale US actions would be adverse, and that we should expect considerable effort by the Communist powers to seek international condemnation of the US.
 - d. That we are not sanguine that the posited US actions would in fact cause Hanoi to call off the war in the South. Also, that even if Hanoi did cease or reduce its support of the VC, considerable political-military improvement would be necessary in SVN if the GVN were to have a chance of permanently reducing the VC threat.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050024-2

BEST COPY
Available

~~SECRET~~

e. That US actions against the DRV might have beneficial effects for the US elsewhere in the world.

(f. That even though there would be many problems involved in undertaking courses against the DRV, these would not necessarily be insuperable, nor of lesser magnitude than problems that would be connected in simply continuing present US courses or opting for some other broad US policy alternative.)

3. One of the problems the assessment raises is whether sensitive intelligence should be used in preparing the US case or White Book. At my suggestion (in concert with FE Division and [redacted], the assessment's proposed answer is no. It is my understanding that Mr. William Jordan (State) will be in touch with you further on the general question of releasing intelligence for US White Book purposes.

4. I was well impressed with the ability and good sense of the sub-committee members, and consider that the interim assessment is a good, albeit wordy, piece. I share its judgments, and know that they accord fairly closely with those of Bill Colby and O/NE. Mr. Don Gregg (FE/VIC) also participated in the sub-committee's work. Please call upon us further on these matters, should you wish.

[redacted]
Chief FE Staff
Office of National Estimates

Distribution

Orig. to Mr. Elder for DCI
1 - [redacted] for DDCI
1 - DD/I
1 - CFE
1 - AD/NE

[redacted]